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NOTES
COST OF SUBSTITUTE FACILITIES AS A MEASURE
OF JUST COMPENSATION WHEN THERE
IS A PRIVATE CONDEMNEE
The Constitution provides that private property shall not "be
taken for public use, without just compensation."1 The usual measure
of "compensation!' when a parcel of land is taken by power of emi-
nent domain is the fair market value of the property at the time taken.2
However, market value is not the only measure, of just compensa-
tion, and there are situations where market value either cannot be
determined or does not result in "just compensation" to the owner of
the property.' As an example, consider the following situation: the
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V (emphasis added). This provision is the only one in
the Constitution concerning the exercise of the power of eminent domain. It is gener-
ally conceded that eminent domain is a power of the sovereign, inherent in and insepara-
ble from the idea of sovereignty. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875).
Thus, the Constitution is not the source of the power of eminent domain but serves to
limit the exercise of the power in two ways: the property taken must be taken for a
"public use," and there must be "just compensation" for the property taken. This Note
will focus upon the latter requirement.
Since the fifth amendment specifically mentions "private property," it might be con-
tended that the cost of substitute facilities doctrine, developed for protection of public
property owners, see notes 8-23 infra and accompanying text, is not a measure of com-
pensation under the fifth amendment and need not be extended to similar facilities in
private hands. This contention proves inadequate due to the fact that the duty to com-
pensate for public property taken by eminent domain does arise under the fifth amend-
ment:
While the [fifth] amendment reads that "private property cannot be taken for
public use, without just compensation," yet "private," as thus used, includes
property which is ordinarily regarded as public property---such as that held for
public uses by a state. United States v. Wheeler Township, 66 F.2d 977, 982
(8th Cir. 1933) (emphasis in original).
Thus, the compensation for public facilities by provision of substitute facilities is clearly
compensation under the fifth amendment.
2. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949); United States ex rel. TVA
v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275 (1943); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374
(1943). "Fair market value," as used here, means the amount a purchaser willing but
not obliged to buy the property would pay to an owner willing but not obliged to sell
it. 4 NicHoLs ON EMnqENT DOMArN § 12.211] (rev. 3d ed. 1971).
3. The guiding principle of just compensation is reimbursement to the owner
for the property interest taken. He is entitled to be put in as good a position
pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken. He must be made whole
but is not entitled to more. In many cases this principle can readily be served
by the ascertainment of fair market value .... But this is not an absolute
standard nor an exclusive method of valuation. United States v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961) (citations omitted).
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federal government condemns an ancient church building, still active-
ly used for religious purposes, to build an expressway. The building
and land have a "market value" of $100,000, 4 but due to rising
costs the church as it exists today would cost $200,000 to replace. In
addition, building code regulations, which apply to new but not to ex-
isting buildings, would prevent replacement with the same type of
building and would add $100,000 to the cost of a new church. A
court determining just compensation for the property would have to
choose the appropriate measure from among market value ($100,-
000), replacement cost ($200,000) less depreciation, or the cost of
substitute facilities ($300,000). When the condemnee is a govern-
mental unit, the cost of substitute facilities has been applied as a
means of determining just compensation for the property taken.5 Re-
cently, in United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land,6 the Third Circuit
became the first federal court of appeals to conclude that the cost of
substitute facilities could be applied as a measure of just compensa-
tion not only to public owners of nonprofit facilities but to private
owners of such facilities as well.r
4. For facilities of this type, there is seldom a real market value since few parties
engage in the buying and selling of churches. Thus, market value in this case means
not the unique value of the building as a church but only the value predicated upon a
general use of the facility. This situation generally applies to special-use facilities, re-
gardless of whether operated for profit or not.
5. See notes 8-23 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the substitute
facilities doctrine as applied to public owners of property. For a more detailed discus-
sion, see Note, Just Compensation and the Public Condemnee, 75 YALE L.J. 1053
(1966); Note, The Sovereign's Duty to Compensate for the Appropriation of Public
Property, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1967).
6. 506 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1974).
7. The Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the Lutheran Church in America
owned and operated several summer camps on land condemned by the United States.
The camps had been operated for a number of years at a loss; there was no fair market
value for the facilities as a camp; by virtue of grandfather clauses in state legislation
the present camps could have continued to operate with somewhat primitive facilities
while replacement would require far more elaborate facilities; and the cost of substitute
facilities was much higher than any market value that could be attributed to the present
facilities. Id. at 798. The lower court had held that the cost of substitute facilities as
a measure of compensation was available only to a governmental condemnee. Id. The
Third Circuit held that the cost of substitute facilities was available as a measure of com-
pensation to private owners of nonprofit facilities and remanded the case to the lower
court for a determination of whether this was a proper case for such application. Id.
at 802. This case is the first in which the question has been before a federal circuit
court; however, several state courts have considered the question, reaching conflicting
results. Compare, e.g., Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Au-
thority, 355 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956) (allowing application of cost of substi-
tute facilities where a Girl Scout camp was taken) with State v. First Methodist Church,
6 Ore. App. 492, 488 P.2d 835 (1971) (disallowing application of the cost of substitute
facilities where a church youth center was taken).
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COST OF SUBSTITUTE
FACILITIES DOCTRINE
The cost of substitute facilities doctrine" provides that when a
subordinate governmental body9 owns facilities being taken by power
of eminent domain by a superior governmental body and when the
condemnee is required to furnish such facilities1" or to continue the
services for which the facilities are necessary, just compensation is to
be measured by the cost of providing the necessary substitute or re-
placement facilities.1- Courts developed the cost of substitute facilities
doctrine to meet the unique needs of public condemnees. When prop-
erty held by a governmental entity for a public use is condemned, spe-
cial problems often arise in determining the amount of compensation
that should be paid, since in most instances the facilities taken are not
commonly bought or sold on the open market and are seldom operat-
ed for profit. Where such property does have a market value, the val-
ue is often so low that it does not represent the loss sustained by the
8. While the terms "cost of substitute facilities doctrine" and "substitute facilities
doctrine" are often used interchangeably, this Note will use only the former so as to
avoid confusion with the concept of "substitute condemnation." Substitute condemna-
tion describes the practice in which the condemnor actually condemns other property
with which it compensates a condemnee for property taken. See generally Comment,
Substitute Condemnation, 54 CALrF. L. R v. 1097 (1966).
9. The term "subordinate governmental body" is used merely to indicate an entity
whose property is subject to the eminent domain power of another governmental unit
(e.g., a town as compared to a state or the federal government).
At one time, there was a question of the federal government's power to condemn
property owned by another governmental unit. However, it is now clear that the federal
power of eminent domain is superior to all uses of property by lesser governmental units.
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 240 (1946).
10. Courts have limited the, application of the cost of substitute facilities doctrine
to instances where replacement is a matter of necessity. Some courts have required that
the necessity be legally mandated while others have adopted a less stringent standard,
factual necessity, in determining whether the substitute facility doctrine should be ap-
plied. See notes 18-23 infra and accompanying text. Regardless of the test applied, it
is clear that if a facility taken is no longer in use or is used only sporadically, the courts
will not award the cost of substitute facilities as just compensation.
11. E.g., California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1968); United States
v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Certain Lands, 246 F.2d
823 (3d Cir. 1957). The Supreme Court apparently recognized the cost of substitute
facilities doctrine in Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923), a case upholding the
constitutionality of a statute authorizing the government to condemn additional property
adjacent to land to be flooded by a dam and reservoir project as a substitute site for
the purpose of relocating a town situated within the project:
A town is a business center. It is a unit. If three-quarters of it is to be de-
stroyed by appropriating it to an exclusive use . . . , all property owners,...
as well as the State, whose subordinate agency of government is the municipal-
ity, are injured. A method of compensation by substitution would seem to be
the best means of making the parties whole. Id. at 82-83.
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owner, the public condemnee. 12
The purpose of the cost of substitute facilities doctrine is to en-
sure that sufficient damages will be awarded to finance a replacement
for the condemned public facility.13 Therefore, the measure is used
not only when there is no market value for the property taken, but
even where there is a market value. In the latter situation, the cost of
substitute facilities measure is used regardless of whether the award it
produces is greater than or less than the value of the property.' 4
The presumption of a community interest in the continuation of
the facilities, or the services available through the facilities, precludes
the application of the replacement cost less depreciation standard as
the measure of compensation when public facilities are taken. Gener-
ally, there is no reduction in the award for the amount of depreciation
when the cost of substitute facilities is used as the measure of compen-
sation as there is when the measure of compensation is replacement
12. Market value for governmental facilities as such does not exist; thus market
value in this context gauges the worth of the facility for general use, not the special
use for which it is provided. For example, public schools are rarely bought and sold
on the market as "schools" although a school may be purchased for some general use,
such as a warehouse. That market value is likely to be substantially lower than the cost
to the community of providing the school. The excess cost to the community of provid-
ing the new school is the loss sustained by the condemnee.
13. It should be noted that the cost of substitute facilities doctrine does not require
exact duplication of the facilities taken. The replacement need only be functionally
equivalent; the equivalence required is one of utility. United States v. Certain Property,
403 F.2d 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760, 764
(4th Cir. 1958).
14. Fort Worth v. United States, 188 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Des Moines County, 148 F.2d 448 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 743 (1945). This
result rests upon the rationale that the community is made "whole" by the provision of
substitute facilities, and that this is all that is required by the fifth amendment. "[ahe
landowner] is entitled to be put in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had
not been taken. He must be made whole but is not entitled to more." Olson v. United
States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). However, it is arguable that the "fair market value"
measure of just compensation should be applied when the facility taken has a substantial
market value. The substitute facilities doctrine was developed originally to deal with
the taking of roads, bridges, and similar facilities, which by their nature are not likely
to have value independent of the use they serve. When the property taken is a public
building in a commercial district, the building has the value to the governmental unit
of the use it serves but it also has value to the governmental unit in the amount of the
price it would bring if sold on the open market. "Just compensation" or "making whole"
would seem to require consideration of both values, the measure of compensation being
determined by the greater.
In accordance with this rationale, the Third Circuit in the 564.54 Acres case indi-
cated that when a private landowner is eligible for the cost of substitute facilities, he
would be entitled to the greater of the two measures, market value or cost of substitute
facilities, since he has a proprietary interest as well as community interest in the prop-
erty. 506 F.2d at 800.
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cost less depreciation.' 5
In addition, the use of replacement cost' 6 alone is not always suf-
ficient since it is based upon a duplication of the existing facilities
when duplication may no longer be adequate to meet statutory or reg-
ulatory requirements for such facilities.' 7 By awarding the cost of sub-
stitute facilities, there is an assurance which replacement cost does not
provide that the facilities and their related services can continue to ex-
ist (i.e., where depreciation in the original facility has been substan-
tial or where a replacement of the same facility would no longer be ac-
ceptable due to more stringent building code requirements).
Courts that have applied the cost of substitute facilities doctrine
when there is a taking of public property by a superior governmental
unit have agreed that the measure is used only when replacement of
the facility taken is "necessary."' 8 The courts have reasoned that if the
governmental entity involved does not need to provide a substitute for
the property taken, it has suffered no loss apart from the market value
of the property, which is usually very low.' 9
15. See, e.g., Town of Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953); Town of Bedford v. United States, 23 F.2d 453 (1st
Cir. 1927). But see United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804 (2d Cir.
1968). In the latter case the court upheld the use of the cost of substitute facilities
as the measure of damages but indicated that the substitution cost should be discounted
by reason of the benefit which accrues to the condemnee when the new building replaces
one with expired useful years. A method of valuation which fails to allow for deprecia-
tion in effect gives a bonus to the municipality whose structure is taken, since it has
received the use of the structure at no cost. See notes 56-59 infra and accompanying
text for the proposition that disregarding the amount of depreciation is necessary to
achieve the objectives of the cost of substitute facilities doctrine.
16. While the terms "cost of substitute facilities" and "replacement cost" are often
used interchangeably, for this Note "replacement cost" will mean the cost of replacing
the condemned facility as it exists at the time of condemnation while "cost of substitute
facilities" will mean the cost sufficient to provide for continuation of the facility, some-
times a quite different amount.
17. Examples would be requirements that all new construction take place on certain
minimum-sized lots, include certain safety features not required of older buildings, or
include certain sanitation features not required of older buildings. (An analogous situa-
tion would be the present requirement that all new cars have anti-pollution devices.)
The distinction between replacement cost and cost of substitute facilities does not include
inadequacy caused by increased use of the facility (i.e., a church built for 100 people
but now used by 300) or inadequacy caused by the outmoded nature of existing facili-
ties.
18. E.g., United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968); California
v. United States, 395 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d
690 (2d Cir. 1965). All the courts applying the cost of substitute facilities doctrine
have applied the requirement that replacement be a "necessity," though some require it
to be a "legal necessity" while others only require that it be a "factual necessity." See
notes 20-34 infra and accompanying text.
19. E.g., United States v. New York, 168 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1948). The taking in-
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Some courts have held that there exists a necessity to replace
public facilities only where such replacement would be legally man-
dated.20 The rationale behind the legal necessity test is that if the gov-
ernmental unit is not required to replace the facility, there can be no
loss. 21 The requirement of legal necessity disregards the fact that the
mere existence of the facility supposedly represents a choice by the
community that the facility exist and at least a perception that the fa-
cility provided a benefit to those who used it. Thus, the condemnation
of such a facility causes a loss to the community, regardless of wheth-
er replacement is "required." This loss becomes more obvious when
the facility is one which the members of the community would choose
to replace. In such a case, the community must bear the cost of the
new facility while receiving only market value, a compensation usual-
ly insufficient to ensure continuation.
Other courts, rejecting the requirement that the replacement of
the facility be a matter of legal necessity, have adopted a test of "fac-
tual necessity."2 2 The "factual necessity" standard provides that if the
condemned facility is reasonably necessary to the public welfare, com-
pensation equal to the cost of substitute facilities is to be provided.23
When the standard is "factual necessity," the burden rests upon the
condemnee to show that there exists a necessity reasonably related to
public welfare. Thus, while the term "necessary for public welfare"
causes definitional problems in this context, the "factual necessity"
test gives a court greater latitude than the more easily interpreted "le-
gal necessity" standard.
EXTENSION OF THE COST OF SUBSTITUTE FACILITIES
DOCTRINE TO PRIVATE CONDEMNEES
A court which applies the "legal necessity" standard clearly
would be unwilling to extend the cost of substitute facilities doctrine
volved certain streets for which there was no necessity for replacement. The court held
that the city was entitled only to the cost of substitute facilities, and if there was no
"necessity," the city suffered only nominal damages. The court reasoned that the city
really had been relieved of the burden of maintaining such unnecessary streets.
20. E.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760, 764 (4th Cir. 1958);
United States v. Wheeler Township, 66 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1933).
21. E.g., Woodville v. United States, 152 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1946); United States
v. Wheeler Township, 66 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1933).
22. E.g., United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965); United States
v. Certain Lands, 246 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1957). In the former case, the court said that
the necessity rule "looks to the pragmatic needs and possibilities, not just to the technical
legal minima." 346 F.2d at 695.
23. United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1968). At least
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to private nonprofit landowners since there can never be a legal obli-
gation to maintain such facilities. For example, in State v. First Meth-
odist Church,24 an Oregon court refused to apply the substitute facili-
ty measure of damages where a church youth center was taken by
eminent domain. The court concluded that the application of the cost
of substitute facilities doctrine was limited to the situation "where the
property taken performs a legally necessary function."2 5 The court
pointed out that "[d]esirable as it may be for the church to operate
the youth center, it had no legal duty to do so. ''26
On the other hand, the Third Circuit in United States v. 564.54
Acres of Land2" rejected the position that only a "governmental entity
under a legal obligation to replace a condemned facility should be en-
titled to indemnification to the extent of the substitute facilities mea-
sure of just compensation, ' 28 and concluded that the cost of substitute
facilities is available to private owners of nonprofit community facili-
ties as well. The court based this result on the ground that the Gov-
ernment's position "would produce the anomalous result that the fed-
eral government's fifth amendment duty of fair compensation, which
would seem to be equally applicable throughout the country, would
vary according to the vagaries of local law. ' 29 The Third Circuit ap-
pears to have adopted the standard enunciated by the Second Circuit
one commentator has suggested that even a "factual necessity" test is inappropriate and
that the correct approach would be to determine whether a proposed substitute would
serve a rational governmental purpose. Note, Just Compensation, supra note 5, at 1055.
24. 6 Ore. App. 492, 488 P.2d 835 (1971). The court held that the "substitute
facility" theory, rather than market value, was not appropriate for evaluation of a church
youth center building where the facility was not one which the condemnee had a legal
duty to maintain.
25. Id. at 495, 488 P.2d at 837.
26. Id. at 496, 488 P.2d at 837. The problem with the decision is that the court's
requirement that there be a legal necessity for replacement of the facility taken is based
upon two cases, United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), and United
States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760, 764 (4th Cir. 1958), which are in conflict as
to the correct result. The Second Circuit case, United States v. Certain Land, stands
for the proposition that "'necessity' . . . looks to the pragmatic needs and possibilities,
not just to technical legal minima." 346 F.2d at 695. Had the court correctly inter-
preted that case, it is questionable whether the conclusion that there must be a legal ne-
cessity for the facilities to be replaced would have been reached. It should be noted that
the court also denied recovery of the cost of substitute facilities on an alternative ration-
ale, that the usual methods of demonstrating market value did exist in this case. See
note 59 infra and accompanying text for the proposition that market value should not
be relevant where the case is otherwise appropriate for application of the cost of substi-
tute facilities doctrine.
27. 506 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1974).




in United States v. Certain Property,30 that if a condemned facility is
reasonably necessary for public welfare, then "compensation is mea-
sured not in terms of 'value' but by the loss to the community occa-
sioned by the condemnation." 31  Under this standard, the question of
reasonable necessity is a factual one, to be determined by the trial
court.
3 2
The Third Circuit did not determine in 564.54 Acres of Land
whether there was actually a factual necessity for replacement of con-
demned camp facilities, 3 nor did the court give the lower court any
guidance on the factors to be considered when resolving that issue.
Given the nebulous nature of the question of factual necessity when
public facilities are involved, the problem is only exacerbated when
private facilities are taken. One can imagine the problems arising
when a jury determines as a factual matter that there is no need to re-
place a recreational center run by blacks or that replacement of a
church of an unconventional faith is not needed, while another jury
determines that the local YMCA or Baptist church is certainly neces-
sary to the public welfare and applies the substitute facilities measure
of damages.34
If the courts are to apply the cost of substitute facilities measure
of compensation to privately owned nonprofit facilities, there is a
need to develop a new and clearer standard for determining the ne-
cessity of the condemned facility in terms of the public welfare. Two
approaches could be taken in the formulation of this standard. The
first approach would be to create an irrebuttable presumption that a
private nonprofit facility is "necessary."35 While attractive on its face
because of apparent ease of application, this rule would result in a
30. 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. Id. at 804.
32. Id.
33. 506 F.2d at 802. The Third Circuit only decided that the cost of substitute fa-
cilities doctrine could be applied to private condemnees as well as public condemnees.
The actual determination of whether the present case was appropriate for such applica-
tion was left to the district court.
34. See Comment, The Lord Buildeth and the State Taketh Away-Church Con-
deination and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 46 U. COLO. L. RFv. 43
(1974) (discussion of the potential first amendment problems arising when a decision
to condemn church property is made). Many of these same problems arise when the
determination is to be made as to whether a certain religious facility is "factually neces-
sary." See also notes 53-55 infra and accompanying text for the potential problems when
a condemnor must choose between condemning public property and church property.
35. "Nonprofit" facilities would have to be satisfactorily defined. An example
would be to provide that any facility owned by an organization which qualifies for the
charitable organization exemption from federal income taxation under section 501(c) (3)
of the Internal Revenue Code would be considered "necessary."
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greater protection to privately owned facilities than is currently ex-
tended to similar facilities owned by local governmental units. With
regard to public facilities, substitution may be unnecessary; the public
need may no longer exist or adequate alternative facilities may be
available.36 Alternatively, the condemnor's new facilities may serve
the same public interest as well as or better -than the condemned facili-
ties.37 Thus, to consider all facilities owned by a nonprofit organiza-
tion as "necessary" would be inappropriate, particularly in light of the
fact that the substitute facilities doctrine does not provide such broad
coverage to public condemnees, whose needs it was developed to
protect.
A second approach would be to modify the standard proposed
by one commentator for public condenees: 3 that the only issue as
to necessity should be whether the proposed substitute would serve a
rational governmental purpose. The modified standard would estab-
lish a rebuttable presumption that facilities owned by a nonprofit or-
ganization3 9 are "necessary" in the sense of having a purpose rational-
ly related to the public welfare. The government then would have the
burden of showing that the facility has no purpose rationally related
to public welfare in light of existing circumstances. Given this stan-
dard, a court is no longer faced with the problem of determining the
"factual necessity" of a facility owned by a nonprofit organization. On
the contrary, the court can assume that a facility meets the require-
ment of necessity, until the government demonstrates that the facility
is not desirable, convenient, attractive, or otherwise beneficial. If the
courts are unwilling to adopt such a standard for determining necessi-
ty, the extension of the cost of substitute facilities doctrine to private
condemnees may be theoretically possible but realistically impossible
due to the problem in determining when such facilities are "factually
necessary" to the community welfare.
36. E.g., United States v. City of New York, 168 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1948).
37. E.g., United States v. Arkansas, 164 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1947); Jefferson
County v. TVA, 146 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1945).
38. Note, Just Compensation, supra note 5. Although the Note has been cited by
several courts in their opinions, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d
796, 800 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 803 (2d Cir.
1968), no court has specifically accepted the proposed standard.
The reason that the standard must be modified with regard to private condemnees
is that it is framed in terms of "rational governmental purpose." While "rational gov-
ernmental purpose" is applicable to property owned by a public condemnee, it is doubt-
ful that the concept is useful when property is owned by a private condemnee. The
proposed standard, "some purpose rationally related to public welfare," could be applied
not only when there are private condemnees but public condemnees as well.
39. See note 35 supra for a suggested definition of "nonprofit organization."
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Even assuming that the problem in applying the requirement of
"necessity" can be surmounted, the basic policy issue of whether the
cost of substitute facilities doctrine should be extended to private con-
demnees would still be unresolved. When there exists a fair market
value for the facilities condemned and when such facilities are operat-
ed for profit, there has been no suggestion that the usual measure of
"just compensation," fair market value, is inadequate.4 0 Even where
the property, due to its unique nature, has no market value, courts
have found that when such property is operated for profit, "just com-
pensation" can be achieved by giving the owner the present value of
the capitalized earnings from the facility. Thus, it is only with regard
to facilities operated for other than profit motives and which, because
of their unique nature, have no market value or have a market value
so low that such compensation would result in injustice to the owners
and the public,41 that the issue is presented.4
The Third Circuit in 564.54 Acres of Land relied upon lan-
guage by the Supreme Court indicating that fair market value is not
an absolute standard and that courts should be willing to depart from
it when equity requires. 43 In the case of privately owned special-use
property, where there is a limited market value, or none at all, courts
40. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. The fact that fair market value is
compensation for the owner is obvious since the condemnee can readily replace the prop-
erty in the marketplace at a cost equal to the condemnation award. While there may
exist a public interest in seeing such facilities continued, it may be assumed that if prof-
itable, the free market mechanism will function so that a replacement will be provided
by some entrepreneur.
41. Loss results to the public because the lower market value will be inadequate to
ensure replacement. Injustice results to the owners since, when someone operates a non-
profit facility, one assumes that his "value" results from the satisfaction of providing
the facilities to benefit others, not the monetary value of the facility. If the facility
is not replaced, the "value" to the owner is lost.
42. An example of this would be a church with a market value of $100,000 (assum-
ing that such market value is for the facility for general purposes and that there exists
no local market for churches, as such) but which would cost $300,000 to replace.
43. Our prior decisions have variously defined the 'just compensation' that the
Fifth Amendment requires to be made when the Government exercises its
power of eminent domain. The owner is entitled to fair market value, but that
term is not an absolute standard nor an exclusive method of valuation. The
constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from
the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from technical concepts of
property law. 506 F.2d at 799, quoting United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488,
490 (1973) (citations omitted).
It should be pointed out that the language involved comes from a case where the
Court determined that market value provided too high a level of compensation, and it
has been suggested that the Court may be more willing to depart from fair market value
as a measure of compensation when such departure results in benefit to the government.
Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How lust is Just Compensation, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 765, 808 (1972).
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have been willing to consider the reproduction or replacement cost,
less depreciation, as a measure of compensation." However, such a
formula fails to allow for the situation where continuation of the func-
tion provided through the facility would be impossible due to a great
amount of depreciation or a change in circumstance which would pre-
vent substitution with the same type of facility.45 Such was the situa-
tion in 564.54 Acres of Land where a camp run by the Lutheran
Church was of low market value and where the reproduction of the
facilities would have been legally inadequate due to statutory provi-
sions relating to the standards newly constructed camps must
meet.46
Generally, the private property owner's interest in continuation
of his facilities is considered irrelevant to the determination of just
compensation.47 When a nonprofit organization is a condemnee, it is
deprived only of the market value of the property; if there is any loss
from the failure of the continuation of the facility, it is that which the
public suffers in losing the benefit of the operation of the property.48
Thus, the determinative question is whether the public has a sufficient
interest in seeing such nonprofit facilities continued that the condem-
nor should be required to provide an amount adequate to ensure such
continuation. When the property is publicly owned, this public loss is
what the substitute facilities doctrine, under the "factual necessity"
test,4 9 is designed to compensate. While placing the compensation in
the hands of the condemnee, it actually ensures that the public as a
whole is compensated for the deprivation of the facilities by enabling
the acquisition of substitute facilities.50 Assuming that there exists a
44. 4 NICHOLS ON EmiNENT DoMAN § 12.32[3][b] (rev. 3d ed. 1971); see, e.g.,
Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Paternostro, 236 La. 223, 107 So. 2d 451 (1958).
45. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
46. 506 F.2d at 798.
47. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925) (where fact that land
was particularly suited to condemnee's business was irrelevant in determining compensa-
tion). See generally D. HAGmAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
LAW 339 (1971).
48. This, of course, excludes any psychological benefit the owner may receive from
carrying on activities to benefit others or any benefits he may believe might accrue in
a later life due to his works during the present life. See, e.g., 2 Corinthians 5:10 (Re-
vised Standard): "For we must all appear before the. judgment seat of Christ, so that
each one may receive good or evil, according to what he had done in the body."
49. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text. This is true to a larger extent
when the "legal necessity" test is applied since in that situation the public owner is being
protected only against being legally forced to replace the facility, and thus it is less clear
that there is a concern about the loss of the facility to the general public.
50. The requirement that the facility be one that is going to be replaced would sup-
port this conclusion since, if it is not one that would be replaced, the provision of such
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perceived public benefit in charitable nonprofit activities,51 the "just
compensation" for condemned facilities conducting such activities
should recompense the loss of the public benefit from the operation of
the facility. There is no justification for treating privately owned prop-
erty in a manner different from public property when the interest tak-
en, the general public's interest in the continued use and benefit of the
facilities,5 2 is the same.
An additional reason for extending the cost of substitute facili-
ties doctrine to privately owned nonprofit facilities is to prevent the
government from determining the site of a project on the basis of the
anticipated cost of acquiring the necessary land when the facilities on
the potential sites are identical except for ownership, one being pub-
lic, the other being private. 3 The compensation required for the pub-
lic property would be the cost of substitute facilities (relatively high)
while the compensation required for the private facilities would be
market value (relatively low). While such a result might be avoided
by preventing the government from abusing its discretion in deter-
mining the location for a project, the wide discretion allowed the gov-
ernment in its planning would prevent effective enforcement. 4 The
money will in no way compensate the public for the loss of the facility. However, it
is also arguable that this requirement exists merely to guarantee that the public owner
does not receive a windfall when the facility is not to be replaced.
51. For example, Congress has given nonprofit organizations special treatment in
certain circumstances because of the supposed public benefit that results from charitable
endeavors. See, e.g., INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3) (granting exemptions to
charitable organizations from income taxation); id. § 170 (providing for certain deduc-
tions for taxpayers making contributions or gifts to qualifying charitable organizations).
52. As the Third Circuit said:
We are not dealing with congressional largess toward governmental entities,
-which might justify a distinction between the measure of fair compensation for
governmental and for non-governmental community facilities. Rather we are
dealing with judicial interpretation of the taking clause. Accepting the inter-
pretation that it protects the value of community uses, there is no basis for dis-
tinguishing between governmental and private community uses. 506 F.2d at
801.
While the cost of substitute facilities doctrine, when applied to the taking of public prop-
erty, is intended to provide compensation to the interests of the public as a whole in
the lost facility, the fifth amendment provides no reason for not extending the same pro-
tection to community values when the property taken is privately owned.
53. Consider, for example, choosing "between a highway route traversing land occu-
pied by a private or a public university; the condemnation for emergency office use of
a parochial school or a public school; the destruction of a church rather than a city hall
to permit the building of a federal courthouse." Id.
54. Generally, judicial review of condemnation proceedings is limited to the question
of whether the taking is for a "public use" and whether it is a matter of "necessity."
While "necessity" may include the need to take particular property rather than some
other, its determination is regarded as a matter of legislative discretion. There is no
judicial issue of necessity absent a showing of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion.
Such a showing is difficult. See generally D. HAGMAN, supra note 47, at 315-16.
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better approach would appear to be to remove all temptation for
abuse by establishing a system in which the cost of taking community
facilities would be the same, regardless of whether the facilities were
publicly or privately owned. 5
However, there are several practical difficulties in applying the
cost of substitute facilities doctrine to privately owned property. First,
while the Third Circuit made no specific mention of the treatment to
be accorded the depreciation of the facilities involved, there is an indi-
cation that the factors necessitating application of the cost of substi-
tute facilities measure preclude the deduction of depreciation from the
amount awarded, since to do so might prevent continuation of the fa-
cilities.5 6 However, the Second Circuit has held that when the cost of
substitute facilities doctrine is applied to buildings owned by a public
condemnee, "equitable principles undergirding just compensation re-
quire that the substitution cost be discounted by reason of the benefit
which accrues to the condemnee when a new building replaces one
with expired useful years. '57 The basis of this position is that failure
to consider depreciation will result in a windfall to the owner, one that
would not occur had the measure of compensation been fair market
value. Such reasoning is correct if the cost of substitute facilities doc-
trine is accepted as compensating only the owner of the property taken.
However, if one accepts the proposition that the purpose of the
55. While the exercise of the eminent domain power over property held by a church
does not violate the "free exercise" clause of the first amendment, the taking of church
property rather than some other property merely because the measure of compensation
applied would result in a lower cost for such property would raise first amendment prob-
lems. See generally Comment, supra note 34.
56. Fair indemnification in such circumstances requires compensation sufficient
to provide a substitution for the unique facilities so that the functions carried
out by or on behalf of members of the community may be continued. Depre-
ciated replacement cost often will not permit continuation of such functions.
To meet the requirement of fair indemnification for the taking of community
facilities the courts have developed the "substitute facilities" measure of com-
pensation. 506 F.2d at 799-800.
While depreciated replacement cost is also inadequate when replacement of the facility
with an identical facility will no longer be allowed due to more stringent building re-
quirements, it would appear the court was referring to inadequacy resulting from a reduc-
tion of the award as a result of depreciation as well.
57. United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1968). See also
Note, The Sovereign's Duty to Compensate, supra note 5, at 1118-19:
A method of valuation which fails to allow for depreciation would in effect
give a bonus to the municipality whose structure is taken. It is true that the
choice to take particular public property may cause a unit of government to
rebuild at an inconvenient time. But this sort of inconvenience is not usually
considered a compensable burden; it is disregarded when the measure of dam-
ages is market value-which necessarily takes account of depreciation.
But see State v. Waco Independent School Dist., 364 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963)
(holding that there should be no deduction for depreciation when applying the substitute
facilities doctrine).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1975:1133
cost of substitute facilities measure is to compensate those who have
an interest in the continued operation of the facility, i.e., the public,
this purpose is frustrated by deducting the amount of depreciation
from the award. The loss being compensated is the deprivation of the
benefit of the facilities; the substitution cost is provided to ensure the
continued availability of the facilities. To deduct the cost of deprecia-
tion is to deprive the public of the right to be made "whole" by having
the facilities available for its use and benefit.58
In addition, the fact that such depreciation would be deducted
were market value the measure of compensation is irrelevant since the
cost of substitute facilities measure is not a means of "valuation," an
"exception carved out of the market value test,"59 but rather an alter-
native means of determining just compensation. As such, the courts
are not bound by the consideration of what the owners would have re-
ceived had the "market value" test been applied.
58. The "windfall" problem can be illustrated through two hypothetical situations
modeled on the 564.54 Acres of Land fact setting. A church may own a recreational
or other facility which had a sixty-year projected life when constructed. Only five years
of that projected life remain, and church officials already are in the planning stages of
a fund-raising drive to pay for a new facility. Should the government decide at this
point to condemn the property, the cost of substitute facilities doctrine would require
a payment sufficient to finance construction of a new sixty-year facility (since construc-
tion of a temporary replacement would most likely be inadequate). But forcing the gov-
ernment to finance the entire cost of the new facility would relieve the church of the
burden it was already preparing to undertake. In this situation, however, the trial
judge's discretion could be invoked to find that the insubstantial remaining useful life
of the facility means that the building itself is no longer of such benefit to the public
that the cost of substitute facilities should be borne by the condemning party. Market
value would be a more appropriate measure of damages.
A slightly altered hypothetical, however, presents a more difficult situation. If the
church property, with a sixty-year life at construction, has been used for only thirty
years when the state makes its condemnation decision, the need for application of the
cost of substitute facilities doctrine is greater. Discounting the measure of damages paid
for the "depreciation" could make it difficult for the church to finance its part of the
replacement cost. For instance, a private organization which is in the midst of another
building project may have taxed its financial resources to the limit and be unable to gen-
erate the funds to pay for the "depreciation." In this situation, the church would be
confronted with a choice of attempting to use the state funds to build a temporary re-
placement or a much smaller facility, or channeling the state funds into some other en-
deavor. In either event, the public would be deprived, at least partly, of the benefit it
had received from the condemned facility. Alternatives available to the court are per-
mitting a "windfall" to the private owner, or forcing the public beneficiary to forego
use of the facility. Here, the same policy arguments supporting the cost of substitute
facilities doctrine urge that the condemning government pay the "windfall" price as part
of the cost of taking the property. Theoretically, a charge might be imposed on the
private owner at the end of the projected useful life of the condemned structure; how-
ever, the practical barriers to such an approach are manifest.
59. 403 F.2d at 803. See also California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 266 (9th
Cir. 1968).
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Another difficulty can arise when it can be shown that the facili-
ties taken would not be replaced, for example, due to their obsolete
nature or lack of current use.60 In such a situation the private owner
of nonprofit property should be entitled only to the market value of
the property taken. If the facility is no longer of benefit to the public,
there is no need to guarantee continuation of the facility, the reason
for application of the cost of substitute facilities measure of compen-
sation. Further, the only loss suffered by the condemnee would be the
market value of the property since he will expend nothing to replace
the facility. A related problem is that there is no assurance that, once
awarded the cost of substitute facilities, the owner will actually use the
award to replace the facilities. While this might present a serious
problem were the cost of substitute facilities measure of compensation
extended to owners of profit-making facilities, there is no reason pres-
ently to believe that the recipients will not use the award for the pur-
pose given. None of the state courts which have applied the doctrine
to private condemnees has seen need to consider the problem, 61 nor
have the federal courts when applying the doctrine to public condem-
nees.6 2 While the requirement of "legal necessity" for replacement
may have been designed to meet the problem, the movement to the
"factual necessity" standard would indicate that courts have not
found the possibility of non-continuance to be significant. It would
not appear reasonable to assume that when an organization has gone
to the cost of providing facilities which provide a direct benefit to oth-
ers besides itself, there will be a sudden change of motivation when
the facilities are condemned, resulting in the misuse of funds.63
A more difficult problem arises when the fair market value of
the property taken exceeds the cost of the substitute facilities for the
property.6 4 Several courts have indicated that when the cost of substi-
60. An example is a church still standing but no longer used to hold services. The
property would no longer have the unique function necessitating application of the cost
of substitute facilities doctrine.
61. E.g., Newton Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, 355
Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 769 (1956).
62. E.g., United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968); United
States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965).
63. In addition, in the usual situation where the organization is a tax-exempt organi-
zation, its favorable tax status would probably be endangered. See, e.g., INT. R V. CODE
oF 1954, § 501(c) (3) (which provides that no portion of the net earnings may inure
to the benefit of a private shareholder or individual).
64. For example, a nonprofit facility operated in a commercially desirable area may
have a high market value although the facility could be functionally replaced for a lower
amount by rebuilding in another area (assuming the location is not critical to the func-
tion of the building).
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tute facilities doctrine is applicable, it should be used regardless of
whether market value is lower or higher than the cost of substitute fa-
cilities.6 6 However, these cases involved a unique situation, the taking
of public streets. Streets are considered to be held in trust for the pub-
lic and the legal title to the land over which they run often reposes in
the abutting property owners rather than the governmental unit.66
Thus, the public condemnee suffers no loss since it really owns noth-
ing of value if the roads are not replaced. The situation is different
where the facility involved has a value independent of that created by
the purpose for which it exists.67 In that case, the proprietary interest
of the condemnee cannot be ignored since the owner would not be
made "whole" within the fifth amendment by compensation which
provided less than the value of the proprietary interest. The cost of
substitute facilities measure, developed to compensate the public in-
terest in the facility where market value would be insufficient to do so,
would not constitute just compensation to the owner when the value
of the property exceeded the cost of substitute facilities. Thus, in ef-
fect, the cost of substitute facilities acts as a minimum level of com-
pensation, with the higher compensation allowed where the proprie-
tary value of the facility outweighs the replacement cost. The public
interest in the continuation of the facilities is protected since the own-
er presumably will use a portion of the award to provide substitute fa-
cilities (if one accepts the proposition that owners of charitable non-
profit facilities will continue to have the same motivations which
originally led them to provide such facilities).
-CONCLUSION
Whether the cost of substitute facilities measure of compensation
should be extended to privately owned nonprofit facilities requires
consideration of two important factors. The first is the definition of
the requirement of necessity for replacement of the facility taken. If
the "legal necessity" test is applied, extension of the measure to pri-
vately owned facilities will be impossible. However, even the "factual
necessity" test, because of its nebulous nature, presents problems that
make extension difficult. The solution is a more lenient standard, a
65. Fort Worth v. United States, 188 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Des Moines County, 148 F.2d 448 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 743 (1945).
66. 10 E. MCQUILLEN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 30.32-.36 (3d ed.
1950).
67. For example, a large building in a commercial area, used as a private school,
would have value to the condemnee even if it were not a school since alternative uses
presumably are possible. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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presumption of necessity, "necessity" being defined as having some
purpose rationally related to public welfare, with the burden of rebut-
tal on the government.
The second factor is whether a meaningful distinction can be
made between public and private condemnees, justifying a difference
in treatment. In this regard, the cost of substitute facilities measure
should be viewed not as compensating the owner of the facilities but
as indemnifying those who have an interest in the continuing exist-
ence of such facilities, the general public. Once this principle is under-
stood, there is no reason not to extend the measure to private owners
of facilities which exist for public benefit.
